Carvaka Philosophy Pdf Books

Apr 11, 2018  This event may be a possible denigration of the Carvaka philosophy. In the 9th century CE, Jain philosopher Jinasena wrote the Mahapurana. The book contains the following often quoted words “Some foolish men declare that a creator made the world. The doctrine that the world was created is ill-advised, and should be rejected.

Anonymous Hahahahaa.Who made Vivekananda the know-all of the charvakas?? The charvakas didn't believe in god but they were not as materialists as they are made to sound. They had sound logic on their side. Logic and reason that was irrefutable. This is why they were called - CHARVAK - the sweet speaking ones. They had seen through the brahmin hegemony and were dead against ritual worship. That doesn't make them purely materialistic or epicurean.

They believed in the pursuit of knowledge and like in all religions there were both good or bad atheist. If Vivekananda did indeed write the above arguments then I'm sorry to say HE IS WRONG and the logic above is quite pedantic.

Carvaka Philosophy Pdf Books Download

Author by: Ramkrishna Bhattacharya Language: en Publisher by: Anthem Press Format Available: PDF, ePub, Mobi Total Read: 93 Total Download: 932 File Size: 52,6 Mb Description: ‘Studies on the Carvaka/Lokayata’ is the first attempt at a scientific study of the Carvaka/Lokayata, the materialist system of philosophy that flourished in ancient India between the eighth and the twelfth century CE. This study seeks to disprove certain notions about the Carvaka/Lokayata, particularly the following: that the Carvaka-s did not approve of any other instrument of cognition except perception; and that they advocated unalloyed sensualism and hedonism. This volume also seeks to establish the fact that there existed a pre-Carvaka school of materialism in India, although there is no way to prove that the Carvaka system grew out of it. Author by: Nashwa Saleh Language: en Publisher by: Anthem Press Format Available: PDF, ePub, Mobi Total Read: 71 Total Download: 599 File Size: 49,6 Mb Description: How did the US financial crisis snowball into USD 15 trillion global losses?

14 Jan 2014 One Piece merupakan anime yang bercerita perjalanan kapten bajak laut Monkey D. Luffy beserta teman-temanya untuk berlayar dan. Download film one piece episode 641 bahasa indonesia.

The Charvaka school was a philosophical. Each article costs us about $50 in history books as. Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion (Humanity Books, 1996.

This book offers a clear synthesis and original analysis of the various factors that led to the financial crisis of 2007-2010, and is intended as a supplementary course text for undergraduate and postgraduate students in finance or finance-related courses. Author by: Ancient Scripture Studies Language: en Publisher by: Format Available: PDF, ePub, Mobi Total Read: 17 Total Download: 527 File Size: 49,8 Mb Description: Six centuries before Christ, ancient Hindu philosophers had already embraced Charvaka. Their philosophy was simple: that which is real is what is real.

That is, their epistemology was based on perception. Speculative inference is simply not reliable. We may be right or wrong when we begin to infer. Seeing is believing. And any other direct means of perception.

So supernaturalism is not real. It is a theory without merit.

Thus, no anthropomorphic gods or God. No reincarnation or afterlife of any kind. Charvaka (based on the earlier Lokayata) means that we honestly embrace reality. That is true religion: living joyfully in this world as it actually is.

Living free is a wonderful ritual. Accepting the need to become mature, grownup, in our outlook on life: that is the crying need today as it was two and a half millennia ago.

Introduction To Philosophy Pdf

As we all become Charvakas, at least in part, we will begin to respect ourselves; embrace the real God: the connecting bond of life; and celebrate the gift of this place and time.As you read these nine chapters that summarize the essence of Chavarka Philosophy, ask yourself how your perspective on life compares to this one. This book is offered in the spirit of a challenge to rethink your life in the light of this ancient way. Even if you eventually conclude that it is a mistaken path, may your own journey be enriched by reading this Lokayata philosophy. Author by: Eli Franco Language: en Publisher by: Motilal Banarsidass Publ. Format Available: PDF, ePub, Mobi Total Read: 76 Total Download: 561 File Size: 40,7 Mb Description: The Tattvapaplavasimha is a philosophical text unique of its kind it is the only text of the Carvaka Lokayata school which has survived and the only Sanskrit work in which full-fledged scepticism is propounded.

Notwithstanding that it has been hitherto almost completely ignored. The present book consists of an introduction detailed analysis edition translation with extensive notes of the first half of the text. In the introduction Jayarasi`s affiliation to the Lokayata school is reassessed and his place in the historical development of Indian Philosophy evaluated. New evidence for the dating of Jayarasi is examined and a new dating is suggested. Author by: Pradeep P. Gokhale Language: en Publisher by: Oxford University Press, USA Format Available: PDF, ePub, Mobi Total Read: 22 Total Download: 977 File Size: 48,5 Mb Description: Philosophy in Indian tradition as a purely secular and rational exercise can be located in the Lokayata/Carvaka school of Indian philosophy.

Due to the lack of substantial literary sources, scholars did not try to explore Lokayata philosophically. The present work is the first attempt to explore the philosophical energies inherent in the scattered Carvaka literature through critical and analytical discussions firmly grounded in textual evidences.

Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, who most likely flourishedbetween 800–840 probably in Southern India, was an Indian philosopher,a sceptic loosely affiliated to the materialist Cārvāka /Lokāyata school of thought, the author of one of mostextraordinary philosophical works in India, theTattvôpaplava-siṁha (‘The Lion of the Dissolutionof [all] Categories’). His main claim is that it is not possibleto arrive at true knowledge, because one should first properly definebasic criteria of validity for valid cognitive procedures, which is notpossible without a prior true knowledge of reality against which wecould test the procedures for validity etc. Clearly, our knowledge ofreality and of objects depends on valid cognitive procedures. However,all valid cognitive procedures are either fundamentally flawed andultimately unreliable or they require further valid cognitiveprocedures, and these stand in the same need etc. Therefore, we canneither formulate proper definitions of valid cognitive procedures nordefine what reality is and what basic categories are. This is at leastthe case, he claims, with all the cognitive tools and epistemologicalcategories which are now at our disposal.

• 1. Life, Works, and Philosophical Affiliation
• 2. The Method and Philosophy of Jayarāśi
• Bibliography

1. Life, Works, and Philosophical Affiliation

1.1 The Dating of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa

The first serious attempt to date JayarāśiBhaṭṭa was undertaken by SukhlāljīSaṁghavī and Rasiklāl C. Pārīkh, who broughtthe Tattvôpaplava-siṁha to light, in their 1940 edition(p. iv-xi) of the treatise, assign the work to 8th century (p. x). Thisdating was slightly modified by Sukhlāljī Saṁghavī(1941) who placed Jayarāśi'sTattvôpaplava-siṁha between 725-825, which, in turn, isaccepted by Eli Franco (1987: 12–13). However, the latter, in the‘Preface to the second edition’ of 1994, modifies the dateof Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa and assigns him to the periodof 770–830 on the basis of what he thinks areJayarāśi's indirect references (primarilyterminological grounds) to the Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara (ca.740–800).

In fact, that dating of the Tattvôpaplava-siṁha could beslightly modified to perhaps 800–840. I would place JayarāśiBhaṭṭa after the Digambara Jaina philosopher AkalaṅkaBhaṭṭa (c. 720–780) and before VidyānandaPātrakesarisvāmin (c. 850), a philosopher in the sametradition who commented on Akalaṅka. As Franco (1994: XI) himselfnotices, the Buddhist Kamalaśīla (c. 740–795) nowhere refersto Jayarāśi in his encyclopaedic commentary of theTattva-saṅgraha. Further, we find no mention ofJayarāśi in the oeuvre of Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa,although he was very well acquainted with current ideas of hiscontemporaries. It would be especially surprising in the case ofAkalaṅka Bhaṭṭa not to mention an author who greatlyinfluenced the way Jaina thinkers argued and formulated their thoughts,because both of them seem to belong to South India. On a few occasionsAkalaṅka did have a chance to either allude or even directlyrefer to such an original thinker as Jayarāśi certainly was,but he nowhere does it. A good instance is Akalaṅka's workAṣṭa-śatī ‘In Eight Hundred Lines’(itself a commentary on the workĀpta-mīmāṁsā, ‘An Examination of AnAuthoritative Person’) of Samantabhadra, c. 580–640). In it, (thecommentary on verse 1.3 of Āpta-mīmāṁsā,AṣŚp.2 = AṣS 29.20), Akalaṅka refersto a materialist argument: ‘[The opponent]: “For thisreason it has been said that there is no omniscient person, becausetruth claims [of various teachers competing for primacy] turn out to bewrong cognitive criteria, inasmuch as there is no difference betweenthem (i.e., all are equal in their convincing force). Since one acceptsthat [it is not possible to decide for or against a view among a fewcompeting ones], there is nothing wrong [in rejecting the idea of anomniscient person].” [Akalaṅka:] Ergo this decision of some[thinkers, i.e., materialists] is itself void of any rational basis.For, as we know, the scope of perception [which could prove thematerialist's rejection of an omniscient person] cannot itselfdemonstrate that there cannot be any other proof of an omniscientperson, because this would have too far-reaching consequences. Neithercan [the materialist prove that an omniscient person cannot exist] withthe help of inference, because it has no validity [for him]’.Akalaṅka clearly has in mind a typical materialist philosopherwho rejects the idea of omniscience, but at the same time acceptsperception (pratyakṣa) as the only valid instrument of knowledge,while rejecting the validity of inference (anumāna). That is astandard account of a materialist (Cārvāka / Lokāyata)thinker in India and there is really nothing to suggest that whatAkalaṅka had here in mind as the target of his criticism was asceptic (like Jayarāśi) who rejected the ultimate validityalso of perception.

However, the account changes in what Vidyānanda (c. 850) has tosay on Akalaṅka's passage. Vidyānanda is, to ourknowledge, the first Indian philosopher to know of and to directlyrefer to Jayarāśi. In his Aṣṭa-sahasrī‘In Eight Thousand Lines’, Vidyānanda (AṣS29.20-36.6) takes the passage ‘“Since one accepts that [itis not possible to decide for or against a view among a few competingones], there is nothing wrong [in rejecting the idea of an omniscientperson].” [Akalaṅka:] Ergo this decision of some [thinkers,i.e., materialists] is itself void of any rational basis’(tathêṣṭatvād adoṣa ity ekeṣāmaprāmāṇikaivêṣṭiḥ) asexplicitly implying two kinds of approaches to the same question. First(AṣS 29.20 ff.), he says some nihilistic thinkers (eke) are theLaukāyatika (the followers of Lokāyata, the materialistschool), who do not admit any instrument of knowledge which would couldgo beyond the perceptible world, i.e., they accept perception as theonly cognitive criterion. Second, Vidyānanda says (AṣS 31.2ff.), there are also ‘those who propound the dissolution of [all]categories’ (tattvôpaplava-vādin), a term whichcould hardly be more univocal in its clearly referring toJayarāśi. Had Akalaṅka known of Jayarāśi, hisscepticism and rejection of the validity of perception also, he wouldhave included him among those who rejected the idea of an omniscientbeing.

1.2 Native Place of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa

As little as we know of the exact dates of his life even less we knowabout the place where he flourished, and we are actually left tospeculations, for no hard evidence, such as inscriptions etc., can befound to help us. There are three points that might suggestJayarāśi was of South India, all being rather weak. Thestrongest evidence is the circulation and reception of theTattvôpaplava-siṁha: the first mention of the work ismade by South Indian Digambara authors Vidyānanda (c. 850) andAnantavīrya (turn of 10th and 11th centuries). Another equallyweak piece of evidence is that Jayarāśi's criticalmethod of argument (see below), which the Jainas adopt, firstpenetrates the works of South Indian Digambara authors, incidentallythe same who are the first to make reference to Jayarāśi.This method of critique becomes the standard one among Gujarati Jainasonly at a later stage. The third argument in favour of South Indianorigin of Jayarāśi(Saṁghavī–Pārīkh 1940, xi), even weakerthat the two above, is his title Bhaṭṭa, regularlyappended to the names of a number of South Indian philosophers andoften used as an official title of South Indian Digambara high rankclerics (bhaṭṭa,bhaṭṭāraka). Jayarāśi's title mightsuggest he was both South Indian and a Brahmin by social class(varṇa). However, the title Bhaṭṭa is notexclusively used by Brahmins or exclusively in South India, thoughthere is indeed a certain tendency of this kind. However, since thereseems nothing at all to suggest that Jayarāśi was born inNorth India, even such slight hints gain some evidential weight.

1.3 Works of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa

The only preserved work of Jayarāśi is theTattvôpaplava-siṁha (‘The Lion of the Dissolutionof [all] Categories’). Its palm leaf manuscript was discovered in1926 in a manuscript library at Patan by SukhlāljīSaṁghavī and Rasiklāl C. Pārīkh, and the textremained virtually unknown until its publication in 1940.

The work was quite well known in mediaeval philosophical milieu, bothin the South and North of India, but hardly ever treated in a way aserious and original philosophical treatise deserves: Indianphilosophers of established traditions do not, as a rule, refer to thework directly or refute its contents, not to mention any attempt at theproviding a genuine appraisal of the work or entering into discussionwith its author. They simply ignored it.

Two reasons might be mentioned for such a situation. First, Indianphilosophers did not principally engage in discussions withrepresentatives of the materialist school, except for standardiseddismissive refutations of a few basic materialist theories, which arementioned by Indian philosophers in their works in order to render a‘complete’ picture of the philosophical spectrum. Thesestandardised, habitually repeated refutations were not applicable toJayarāśi, who was not a typical representative of theCārvāka / Lokāyata school. New powerful philosophicalmachinery would have to be applied to engage in a discussion withJayarāśi. And that is precisely the second reason: thearguments Jayarāśi consistently applies, his rigid andcoherent lines of argumentation proved to be an extremely hard piece ofcake to swallow for those whose views he criticised. It seems,therefore, that the general approach of Indian philosophersvis-à-vis Jayarāśi was that of disregard and failureto notice the weight of his work. He is occasionally mentioned in apositive light when Indian authors acknowledgeJayarāśi's powerful method of critical analysis, andthese are primarily, or even exclusively, Jaina authors. Sometimes theyeven refer to Jayarāśi as an expert in some fields, e.g. byMalliṣeṇa (c. 1229), who says: ‘A refutation of allcognitive criteria in details should be consulted from theTattvôpaplava-siṁha’ (SVM, p.118.1-2).

The text of Tattvôpaplava-siṁha was preserved withoutany commentary and it seems that its was never commented upon. Wecannot say with absolute certainty whether he had any followers orwhether he established an independent school, but that is not unlikelybecause we occasionally come across the expressiontattvôpaplava-vādin in the plural: ‘those whopropound the dissolution of [all] categories’ in philosophicalliterature, and across the single term Tattvôpaplava used asif it denoted a separate school.

It is not certain whether Jayarāśi composed any other work.He himself refers to a treatise entitled Lakṣaṇa-sāra(‘The Quintessence of the Definition [of Cognitive Criteria(pramāṇa)]’) on one occasion, while refuting the usageof the term ‘non-verbal’ (avyapadeśya) in thedefinition of the cognitive criterion (pramāṇa, or‘veridical instrument of knowledge’) of the Nyāyaschool. There, he says that the inapplicability of the term has alreadybeen shown in the Lakṣaṇa-sāra and one should consultthat work. It is highly probable that he indeed refers to his own textfor the simple reason that he generally does not mention any works ofany other authors either in support of his own views or in favourablelight, except for the materialist teacher Bṛhaspati and hisBṛhaspati-sūtra. Still, it is not impossible that the texthe referred to under the title Lakṣaṇa-sāra might havebeen penned by another representative of the Cārvāka /Lokāyata school who had been held in esteem by Jayarāśi,e.g. his own guru.

1.4 Philosophical Affiliation of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa

There has been some controversy concerning whetherJayarāśi could at all be ranked among the representatives ofthe Indian materialist school, i.e., among the Cārvākas /Lokāyatas. Until the publication of theTattvôpaplava-siṁha, Jayarāśi was considered atypical representative of the materialist school. It all changed whenthe publication of the work in 1940 made the text available toscholars. The publication revealed that Jayarāśi's vieware far from what one considered materialism and hardly compatible withwhat we so far knew about the schools of the Cārvākas /Lokāyatas.

Nonetheless, Sukhlāljī Saṁghavī and RasiklālC. Pārīkh (1940: xi-xii) take the text as ‘a work ofthe Lokāyata or Cārvāka school, or to be more precise– of a particular division of that school’, emphasisingthat Jayarāśi ‘is developing the doctrine of theorthodox (!) Lokāyata’. The tradition of ascribing the viewto Saṁghavī and Pārīkh that theTattvôpaplava-siṁha is ‘a genuineCārvāka work’ relies rather on the misreading of whatboth the authors say: they are well aware that Jayarāśidevelops an original and independent school within what hehimself considered a materialist tradition. This view, adopted also byRuben (1958), is somewhat modified by Franco (1987: 4–8).

Another line of researchers disagree that Jayarāśi belongedto the materialist tradition at all, typical proponents of this opinionbeing Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (1959), (1989) and Karel Werner (1995).Chattopadhyaya (1989) argues that since Jayarāśi criticisesall philosophical views and schools, he cannot be reckoned as anadherent of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata tradition, becauseone can either be a materialist or sceptic; and clearlyJayarāśi's philosophical views do not fit into thetypical materialist framework. Karel Werner (1995) seems to supportsuch an approach, although with some reservations, but without anysolid rational argument, except for an subjective impression.

There could hardly be a better source of information on the trueaffiliation of Jayarāśi than the author himself. He nowherestates in his work that he is a Cārvāka / Lokāyata, inwhich he does not differ from all other Indian authors who nowheremention their philosophical affiliations in the form: ‘The authorof the present work is Buddhist’ or ‘I am a follower of theNyāya school’. In most cases, such affiliations arecommunicated through the opening sections, e.g. in the introductoryverses (maṅgalâcaraṇa), or in the colophons, butusually an indirect manner, e.g. by paying homage to the Awakened One(buddha) or to a guru or Mahêśvara, or through some otherhint, but it is hardly ever done directly, in an unequivocal manner.Unfortunately, the preserved text of Tattvôpaplava-siṁhadoes not contain any introductory verses (probably there were none),and the colophon contains no hints. The only concealed information inthe opening section of the work could be found the first verse thatoccurs in the very beginning which says: ‘The worldly path(laukiko mārgaḥ) should be followed…/ Withrespect to everyday practice of the world (loka-vyavahāra), thefool and the wise are similar’ (TUS, p.1.9–10 = Franco(1987: 68–6-7)), quoted from some other source, taken as authoritativeby Jayarāśi. The expression ‘the worldly path’(laukiko mārgaḥ) often occurs as a reference to theLokāyata (‘the followers of the worldly [practice]’),e.g. by Haribhadra in his ŚVS1.64. Most importantly,however, Jayarāśi on several occasions quotes verses ofBṛhaspati in order to either support his own opinion or to showthat there is no disagreement between theTattvôpaplava-siṁha and the tradition ofBṛhaspati. Further, he explicitly mentions the materialistteacher by name and refers to him with reverence ‘HonourableBṛhaspati’ (bhagavān bṛhaspatiḥ, TUS,p.45.10–11 = Franco (1987: 228.10)), the reverential termoccurring only once in the whole work. This is rather unique, forJayarāśi does not seem to follow any authorities or to quotepassages and opinions which he unreservedly views in favourable light.There can hardly be any doubt, that Jayarāśi placed himselfwithin that tradition and apparently acknowledged that he wasoriginally trained within it.

Further, Jayarāśi criticises basically all philosophicalschools with two exceptions: the Advaita Vedānta ofŚaṅkara and the Cārvāka / Lokāyata school.The reason for being silent on the tradition of Śaṅkara wasthat the latter was either contemporaneous or posterior toJayarāśi, but there would have been no reason not toformulate any criticism against the Cārvāka / Lokāyataschool, if that had not been Jayarāśi's owntradition.

Jayarāśi is generally very cautious not to express his ownpositive views and theories. But there may be an exception, it seems.On one occasion (in the Buddhist section, TUP, p.57–88 = Franco(1987: 269–271)), while refuting the view that ‘the first momentof consciousness [of the newly born], immediately after the exit fromthe mother's womb, is preceded by another moment ofconsciousness’, he concludes that ‘the first moment ofconsciousness in the womb etc. [i.e., of the newly born], must come fromthe combination of the elements’, which is a typicallymaterialist view. It is however not quite clear how far this conclusionis brought up merely to dismiss the theory of consciousness as aprinciple independent of the matter or the theory of the personalconscious continuum (santāna), and how far the view isJayarāśi's own.

There is also an external evidence corroborating to a certain degreethe thesis about Cārvāka / Lokāyata affiliation ofJayarāśi. Vidyānanda who first mentionsJayarāśi brings some interesting details to light (alluded toabove). In his Aṣṭa-śatī (AṣS 29.20-36.7),he explicitly indicates a category of nihilistic thinkers who reject anumber of vital principles and claim that ‘There is no [reliable]omniscient authority (tīrtha-kāra), there is no [reliable]cognitive criterion (pramāṇa), there is no [reliable]authoritative doctrine (samaya) or [reliable] Vedas, or any kind of[reliable] reasoning (tarka), because they contradict eachother,’ and he quotes a popular verse: ‘Reasoning is notestablished, testimonies differ, there is no sage whose words are acognitive criterion (i.e., authoritative), the essence of the moral law(dharma) is concealed in a secret place (i.e., is not available). The[proper] path is that taken by the majority of people’^[1].Whether the versecomes from an unidentified Lokāyata source, which is notimpossible, or not, it is echoed by Jayarāśi in the abovementioned verse at the beginning of his work and the expression‘the worldly path’ (laukiko mārgaḥ).Interestingly, the verse has an obvious sceptical underpinning. Thecategory of such ‘nihilists’ includes (1) the followers ofthe Lokāyata school (laukāyatika, AṣS 29.26), alsoknown as the Cārvāka (AṣS 30.25), who are associatedwith the view that there is just one cognitive criterion, i.e.perception, and (2) the category of ‘those who propound thedissolution of [all] categories’(tattvôpaplava-vādin, AṣS 31.2). Vidyānanda(AṣS 31.2 ff.) explains who the latter are: ‘Some who arethose who propound the dissolution of [all] categories take (1) all thecategories of cognitive criteria such as perception etc. and (2) allthe categories of the cognoscibles as dissolved (i.e., notestablished)’. Throughout his text, Vidyānanda keeps thesetwo traditions – the Lokāyata and the Tattvôpaplava- separate, although he does acknowledge that they are geneticallyrelated, the main difference between them being whether one recognisesat least one cognitive criterion (Cārvāka / Lokāyata) ornone (Jayarāśi).

Jayarāśi can be therefore taken as a genuine representativeof an offshoot of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata tradition,primarily because he himself thought he was a follower ofBṛhaspati's materialist tradition, and probably because hehad originally been trained in the materialist system. It also seemsvery likely that the representatives of the Cārvāka /Lokāyata system occasionally had sceptical inclinations prior toJayarāśi, which helped him to abandon typically materialistclaims and undertake his sceptical project. However, neither he nor hiswork can be taken as typical representatives of the Cārvāka /Lokāyata school or a first-hand source of information about thattradition. Despite this, the work remains the only authentic, albeitnot ‘orthodox’ treatise of the Cārvāka /Lokāyata tradition that has come down to us.

2. The Method and Philosophy of Jayarāśi

Jayarāśi can be classified as a sceptic, or even amethodological sceptic, who consistently avails himself of a particularmethod to analyse theories and the contents of propositions.

2.1 Use of Reductio Arguments

The point of departure of his methodology is a sophisticated andhighly elaborated reductio type of argument (prasaṅga), developedearlier within the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism and its prominentadherent Nagārjuna (c. 150 CE).

In his method, Jayarāśi analyses a particular thesis T ofhis opponent by, first, listing all logical implications or alldoctrinally possible conclusions C₁, C₂,C₃, … C_n, admissible within theopponent's system, that follow from thesis T. Then hedemonstrates how and why each of such conclusions C₁,C₂, C₃, … C_n eitherleads to an undesired consequence (logically problematic or unwelcomewithin the opponent's system) or contradicts the initial thesisT:

where ‘0’ stands not simply for ‘false’(logically), but may also stand for ‘not admissible within theopponent's specific set of beliefs’, or ‘notcompatible with the opponent's specific set ofbeliefs’. To analyse the truth value or admissibility of each ofthe conclusions C₁, C₂, C₃, …C_n, if their structure is complex,Jayarāśi analyses the conclusions in their turn usingexactly the same method.

What may look like a well-known logical law that underlies the reductioad absurdum argument, i.e.,

[(~p→q) ∧ ~q] → p,

or like other typical laws of the proof by contradiction, i.e.,

[(~p→q) ∧ (~p→~q)] → p,

[~p → (q∧~q)] → p, or

[~p → (q≡~q)] → p ,

seems at first closely mirrorred by Jayarāśi. However, hisapproach is significantly different in one particular aspect. First,Jayarāśi analyses positive theses in order to disprove them.Secondly, the reductio or the proof by contradiction, whereby p isrejected, does not commit one to admitting ~p in the sense of acceptinga positive state of affairs contrary to p. Jayarāśi issatisfied merely with a rejection of a thesis, without postulating hisown solution to a problem. In other words, when Jayarāśidisproves thesis T by demonstrating that its conclusions C₁,C₂, C₃, … C_n are all wrong(either false or doctrinally inadmissible), he does not commit himselfto the contrary thesis ~T with some kind of ontological entailment. Thebetter way to describe his method would be the following patterns:

[(p→q) ∧ ~q] → ~p,

[(p→q) ∧ (p→~q)] → ~p,

[p → (q∧~q)] → ~p, or

[p → (q≡~q)] → ~p ,

To give an example, Jayarāśi first skilfully demonstratesthat the universal cannot exist by mentioning three possibleconclusions: If (T) the universal exists, then (C₁) theuniversal is different from the individuals in which it isinstantiated, (C₂) it is not different from the individuals,or (C₃) it is different from the individuals in some aspectsand it is not different from the individuals in other aspects. Each ofthese options is then analysed into further options, all beingeventually shown as wrong or impossible. Since all the threeconclusions C₁, C₂ and C₃ arerejected, the initial thesis T (‘the universal exists’) isalso rejected. However, he does not say what at all exists, if thereare no universals.

In his method, Jayarāśi does not mention all logicallyconceivable conclusions entailed by a thesis he wants to disprove. Inmost cases, he limits himself just to those implications which arerelevant to the discussion with a particular philosophical school, andall other logical or thinkable implications of which we know that theopponent would never admit for a variety of reason are simplyignored.

Interestingly, the critical method of analysis of the reductio type(prasaṅga) which Jayarāśi so amply uses is basicallyabsent in the works of the Digambara philosopher Akalaṅka,whereas the method is regularly used by his commentator Vidyānandaand all subsequent Jaina thinkers, which may have its historicalrelevance and suggest that Jayarāśi was posterior toAkalaṅka.

The reductionist tactics, which Jayarāśi shared with theMādhyamika Buddhists, was traditionally classified by Brahmanicphilosophers, e.g. the Naiyāyikas, as an eristical dispute orrefutation-only debate (vitaṇḍā) and considered as anon-genuine argument, because the goal of an authentic debate was tostrive for truth, understood of course in positive terms. Were suchcriticisms denying Jayarāśi a genuine argumentative valuejustified? Clearly not, and for a variety of reasons, the mostimportant being that the main objective of Jayarāśi isindicated in the title of his treatise: the dissolution of allcategories. How should we understand it? Was his approach purelynegative, eristical, nihilistic or agnostic? His main objective, itseems, was not necessarily the strong claim that no truths can ever beknown. Rather his intention was to show the fundamental dependence ofour knowledge of reality on cognitive means and categories we acceptmore or less arbitrarily. The dissolution of all categories impliesthat the criteria on which all philosophical systems and theories ofthe world rest are in need of further evidence, which itself is notpossible without adopting some of these categories or some othercategories which again call for further evidence, but which categoriesand methods we chose is ultimately our arbitrary decision. To engage inwhat Brahmanic philosophers would call a ‘genuine debate’(vāda) one would necessarily have to accept that such an arbitrarydecision is ultimate and justified, thus giving up the further searchfor truth, even though the process would be infinite and doomed toterminate untimely. In other words, contradictions and inconsistenciesare, in fact, inherently systemic in the sense that they are generatedby a body of propositions each adopted arbitrary for this or otherreason, and the systemic knowledge ultimately lacks reliable andcoherent foundations. Just as with Pyrrhonism in Sextus'interpretation, Jayarāśi seems to be a perpetualinvestigator: he discards all theories and propositions that areneither consistent nor proof-tight, for which there is also nocompelling evidence. But it would probably be far-fetched to claim thatthe idea of truth did not represent any value for him.

2.2 Scepticism and Definitions

Jayarāśi represents what has been once labelledepistemological scepticism, or ontological scepticism (Hankinson 1995,13ff), i.e., the position in which one refuses to accept the truth ofsome proposition or to affirm the existence of something, withoutdenying it, as distinguished from negative (ontological) dogmatism,i.e., the attitude in which one actually rejects the truth of someproposition and denies the existence of the alleged objects. Further,Jayaraśi's methodological scepticism should not be confusedwith what is covered by the term e.g. in the case of Descartes'approach to seek ultimately firm foundations after all beliefs liableto doubt have been successfully eliminated. Jayarāśi seeksneither ultimate foundations for his system or firm basis for hisepistemology, ontology or ethics, because he never, even vaguely,intimates he would have any. He is satisfied with demonstrating thatall we, the philosophers, have so far established, does not hold. Butcontrary to Decartes' methodological scepticism,Jayarāśi does not really cast doubt on what comes to us fromthe senses.

At the outset of his work (TUS 1), he points out the major deficiencyof our knowledge: ‘To establish cognitive criteria(pramāṇa, instruments of knowledge) depends on properdefinitions. Further, to establish objects of cognitive criteriadepends on cognitive criteria. When proper definitions are absent, howis it possible that one would treat both the cognitive criteria andtheir objects as genuinely real?’ To adopt certain definitions wefirst have to adopt certain definitions and criteria of validity. Thathas to be done vis-à-vis the external reality and tested forvalidity with respect to phenomena that have all the appearance ofreal, for Indian philosophers en bloc accepted the correspondencetheory of truth. To test the definitions, criteria of validity andcognitive criteria with respect to real objects, we should first knowwhat these real objects really are. To know that we have to havereliable instruments of knowledge (cognitive criteria) and criteria ofvalidity at our disposal. We land in vicious circle: we can neitherknow cognisable real objects nor determine what genuine cognitivecriteria are, nor be actually able to define them without having theidea of validity first. Without it we cannot even properly distinguishbetween valid cognitive procedures and invalid ones.

Since it is vital to have a proper definition of a cognitive criterion,or a valid cognitive procedure and criterion of truth for philosophicalenterprise, Jayarāśi analyses such definitions which wereformulated within most important philosophical schools in India. Thecognitive criteria whose various definitions are one by one examinedare perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), presumption(arthāpatti), reasoning based on analogy (upamāna), negativeproof based on absence (abhāva), equivalence (sambhāva),tradition (aitihya), and verbal or scriptural testimony (śabda,āgama). In terms of argumentative structure and nature, they allcan be reduced to three: perception, inference and testimony. Thephilosophical schools which Jayarāśi most frequently refersto and criticises their definitions of the cognitive criteria are theNyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya,Mīmāṁsā as well as Buddhist and Jaina schools.

He demonstrates that no one so far has offered an irrefutabledefinition of perception (which does not have to mean that perceptionas such has to be completely unreliable). All definitions of perceptionare seriously flawed and we cannot rely on it in the way it is defined:we do not have even a reliable method or a dependable criterion todistinguish a genuine perception from a mirage, optical illusion or amental image (e.g. in hallucination, reminiscence or dream). However,Iit is not the case that Jayarāśi argues that ‘there issimply no way … to know that our sense-perceptions aretrue’ (King 1999: 19). What he is up to is to demonstrate that,given our present definitions of perception and categories on which ourepistemology rests, there is no way to determine which of oursense-perceptions are true.

Inference relies on data provided by perception which makes inferencedoubtful. But inference the way it has so far been defined is flawedfor a number of other reasons. There is no reliable way to relateproperties or facts in a truth-conducive way. For instance, to inferthe cause from the effect one would have to first to define whatcausality is, which as Jayarāśi demonstrates cannot be donewith the categories we have at our disposal: there is actually noreliable way to relate A and B as cause and effect. Further, what do werelate in inference: universals with universals, universals with aparticular, or a particular with a particular? Since universals do notexist, inferences which are based on such notions are intrinsicallyflawed. We are left with the idea that inferences depend onparticular-to-particular relation. That being the case, there is nomethod to establish any kind of valid relationship between twoparticulars which could allow us to draw any sound inferences fromsingle-instantiated cases. Further, inferences will have to rely oncases of inductive reasoning which are logically not valid and cannotbe demonstrated to be universally valid. Also testimony of an authoritycannot be a legitimate source of knowledge because, first, suchtestimony would have to rely on other cognitive criteria and, second,we would have no means to determine what a reliable testimony is or whoan authoritative person can be. Therefore, given all availabledefinitions and criteria, nothing can be known for certain.

Jayarāśi's undertaking is not restricted to theexamination of valid cognitive procedures and their definitions. In thecourse of his work, he analyses a number of fundamental ideas anddemonstrates that their definitions are inadequate and they cannotexist as understood and defined by philosophers. These include suchnotions as validity and nonerroneousness, sublation of previousknowledge by a subsequent experience, universals, the relation ofcomposite wholes to their parts, production of cognitions, ontologicalcategories such as inherence of properties in their substrata, thenature of illusion, the definition of what exists (e.g. the realobject's ability to execute causally efficient action,artha-kriyā), the nature of sense-object contact, memory andrecollection, momentariness and permanence, conceptuality or conceptualstate of mind, relation of the conceptual image in cognition to theexternal thing represented, the nature of consciousness (rejection ofnon-material character), rebirth and karmic retribution, causality,visible and invisible objects, absences, rules of inference etc. Allthese ideas, as Jayarāśi demonstrates, stand in need ofproper definition and as long as we do not have them cannot bemaintained in their present form.

2.3 Positive Views

Jayarāśi, as we noted, is cautious not to affirmativelystate anything, and nowhere does he use such expressions as ‘thusit was established that’ (iti sthitam) or similar expressionstypical of all other philosophical works. Despite this, can wereconstruct any positive views he affirms or is his scepticismall-embracing? It seems there a few such views. His clear rejection ofkarmic retribution, afterlife and the supernatural (‘humanactions do no bring otherworldly results, such as rebirth in heavenetc.’) and the claim the ultimate reality for us is what weexperience and what surrounds us concerns both metaphysics and ethics.Metaphysically, there is no supernatural reality of any relevance tous. Ethically, the only criterion to determine what is right and wrongis what people agree to accept as such (‘the worldly path shouldbe followed’). Quite frequently, he uses examples of non-existententities such as demons (piśāca), atoms (paramāṇu)and god (mahêśvara), taking their fictitious character forgranted, which indicates that he apparently rejected invisible realitywhich is intrinsically beyond our senses.

He plainly states that ‘universals do not exist’ (TUP, 4.5ff.), which does not seem to be a mere thesis which he rejects just forthe sake of argument, because throughout his work he will refer to thisclaim (‘we have already shown that universals do notexist’). Does his denial of universals mean that he was anominalist? If so, in what sense? On another occasion (TUS 24) hecriticises the view that composite macroscopic wholes cannot exist, andwhat exists instead are their parts only (a typical Buddhist nominalistposition). He concludes there is no way to demonstrate that compositewholes are non-existent. Interestingly, he nowhere links the idea ofcomposite wholes (and the paradox of the whole and its parts), which heseems to accept, to idea the universal (and the paradox of theuniversal and the particulars as its instantiations), which he clearlyrejects. These two concepts, the wholes and universals, were generallyanalysed in India jointly as two aspects of the same problem: just asthe whole exists (or does not exist) through its parts, in the verysame way also the universal exists (or does not exist) through itsparticulars. Interestingly, Jayarāśi never links these twoissues, precisely because, it seems, he admitted the existence ofmacroscopic objects of our experience (i.e., composite wholes) whereashe rejected the existence of universals. Being a sceptic, he does seemto accept a ‘commonsensical view’ of the world thatconsists of such macroscopic objects, but not of invisible atoms oruniversals, demons and god. In line with this approach, he seemed alsoto maintain that consciousness is a product or combination of the fourelements (see above). It should not come as a surprise to discover thatall these views he shared with genuine materialists of theCārvāka / Lokāyata tradition.

A truly sceptical thesis Jayarāśi entertained was hisassumption that all philosophical claims are always made within aparticular set of beliefs, i.e., within a particular system which isbased on arbitrarily accepted criteria, definitions and categories. Hispragmatic, ‘commonsensical attitude’ is highlighted in averse he quotes: ‘with respect to everyday practice of the world,the fool and the wise are similar’ (see above), becauseultimately we all have to rely on our experience and defective andpartial knowledge of reality.

The conclusion of his work: ‘Thus, when all categories arecompletely dissolved in the above manner, all practical actions (whichentails thought, speech and activity) can be enjoyable, without beingreflected upon’, is quite meaningful. On the one hand it could betaken to imply some kind of a carpe diem attitude: given ourlimitations and intrinsic inability to know with certainty, the onlyoption we are left with is to enjoy the world the way it appears to us.On the other hand, the statement could also suggest that whatJayarāśi had in mind was that for all our practicalactivities, including thinking, verbal communication, behaviour orordinary life, the world of our actions — as long as it is relevant tous — is ‘here and now’ and retains its ultimate validity,even though we are incapable of its proper philosophical analysis.

Bibliography

Primary Literature

Sanskrit Works

Critical Editions of Primary Texts

• Franco, Eli, 1987, Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief: AStudy of Jayarāśi's Scepticism (Alt- undNeu-Indische Studien 35), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag[Reprinted: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1994]. [The edition and Englishtranslation of the first chapter of the text].

Translations of Primary Texts

• Franco, Eli, 1987, Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief: AStudy of Jayarāśi's Scepticism (Alt- undNeu-Indische Studien 35), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag[Reprinted: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1994]. [The edition and Englishtranslation of the first chapter of the text].

Secondary Literature

• Campawat, Narayan, 1995, “JayarāśiBhaṭṭa”, in Ian McGready (ed.), Great Thinkers of theEastern World, Harper Collins, New York, 202–206.
• Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad, 1959, Lokayata. A Study in AncientIndian Materialism, New Delhi: People's Publishing House[Reprinted: New Delhi 1973, 1992].
• –––, 1989, In defence of materialism inancient India: A Study of Carvaka/Lokayata, New Delhi: People'sPublishing House; ‘Chapter 2.6: Jayarāśi’, p. 36ff.
• –––, 1990, in Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya(ed.), Cārvāka/Lokāyata: An Anthology of SourceMaterials and Some Recent Indian Council of PhilosophicalResearch, New Delhi.
• Franco, Eli, 1987, Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief: AStudy of Jayarāśi's Scepticism, MotilalBanarsidass, Delhi 1994 [1st edition: Alt- und Neu-IndischeStudien 35, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1987]. [The secondedition contains an important ‘Preface to the secondedition’].
• –––, forthcoming, “Jayarāśi andthe Sceptical Tradition”, in Matthew Kapstein (ed.), The ColumbiaGuide to Classical Indian Philosophy, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
• Hankinson, R.J., 1995, The Sceptics. The Arguments of thePhilosophers, London – New York: Routledge.
• Joshi, Shubhada A., 1995, Lokāyata – A CriticalStudy (Indian Spiritualism Reaffirmed), (Sri Garib Das OrientalSeries 180), Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.
• King, Richard, 1999, Indian philosophy: an introduction toHindu and Buddhist thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh UniversityPress.
• Klein, Peter D., 1981, Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism,Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
• Mills, Ethan, 2013, The Dependent Origination of Skepticismin Classical India: An Experiment in Cross-cultural Philosophy,Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Philosophy, University of New Mexico, available online.
• –––, 2015, “Jayarāśi’sDelightful Destruction of Epistemology”, Philosophy East andWest, 65(2): 498– 541.
• Matilal, Bimal Krishna, 1985, “Scepticism andMysticism”, Journal of the American Oriental Society105(3) [Indological Studies Dedicated to Daniel H.H. Ingalls]:479–484.
• Preisendanz, Karin C. and Eli Franco, 1998, “Materialism,Indian School of”, in Edward Craig (ed.), RoutledgeEncyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge, 178–181.
• Ruben, Walter, 1958, “Über denTattvopaplavasiṁha des Jayarāśi Baṭṭa, eineagnostizistische Erkenntniskritik”, Wiener Zeitschrift fürdie Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens, 2: 140–153.
• Saṁghavī, Sukhlāl, 1941,“Tattvṁpvopaplāva-siṁha –Cārvāka darśan kā ek apūrv granth”,Bhāratīya Vidyā, 2(1): PAGES.
• Saṁghavī, Sukhlāljī, and Rasiklāl C.Pārīkh, 1940, ‘Introduction’ toTattvopaplavasimha of Shri Jayarasi Bhatta (Gaekwad OrientalSeries 87), Baroda: Oriental Institute, i-xiv [Reprinted:Bauddha Bharati Series 20, Varanasi 1987].
• Tripāṭhī, Chandrabhāl, 1975, Catalogue ofthe Jaina manuscripts at Strasbourg, Leiden: E.J. Brill.
• Werner, Karel, 1995, “Review of Eli Franco: Perception,knowledge and disbelief: a study of Jayarāśi'sscepticism, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass 1994”, Bulletinof the School of Oriental and African Studies, 58(3): 578.

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